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Abstract
Quantitative techniques for exploring future developments in Science and Technology (here 
called Future-oriented Technology Analysis (FTA)) are increasingly important in an era of big 
data and growing computational power. New quantitative techniques such as webometrics, 
altmetrics and prediction markets are complementing more traditional S&T indicators. While 
these techniques hold great promise, it is unclear how robust and appropriate is their use under 
different contexts. In order to help users think through their distinct values and limitations, in 
this article we discuss quantitative FTA techniques in the light of a general analytical framework. 
Following Stirling & Scoones (2009), we position FTA quantitative techniques according to their 
representation of (the incompleteness) of knowledge — i.e. the extent to which they portray their 
knowledge on probabilities and outcomes as problematic. This framework illuminates the 
implicit assumptions about the uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance that distinct quantitative 
techniques make when exploring (in some cases “predicting”) the future. We distinguish between 
techniques that tend to ‘open up’ awareness of new or unexpected futures, and others that tend to 
‘close down’ by pointing out to likely futures.
Introduction
Since the middle of the last century, organisations and policy makers began to use a large number 
of techniques to investigate and influence the future. Several techniques have been proposed 
since the 1960s, some of which rely on quantitative methods — particularly many of the most 
recent ones based on the use of internet data (Eerola & Miles, 2011; Porter et al., 2004). In a recent 
NESTA report (Ciarli, Coad, & Rafols, 2012) we reviewed and classified 26 techniques employed 
in Future oriented Technology Analysis (FTA) grouped in 10 different families, and we discussed 
the contexts in which they are most widely used. Although we use here the terminology from the 
FTA tradition, we notice, for the purposes of this conference, that FTA techniques are special case of S&T 
indicators and/or mapping that explore future developments.
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In this article we assess the FTA techniques reviewed by asking how practitioners represent knowl-
edge when they use quantitative techniques for FTA. In other words, we study how the properties 
of different techniques allow the practitioner to “construct” different states of knowledge about 
the future. 
Following Stirling and Scoones (2009) we focus on two main dimensions: knowledge about 
outcomes and about probabilities. Under the first dimension knowledge is perceived as more or 
less problematic with respect to which outcome is more or less relevant when considering future 
states of the world. Under the second dimension knowledge is perceived as more or less problem-
atic with respect to the probability that specific instances of an outcome will occur in the future. 
We take an explicit constructivist approach: the analyst using an FTA technique can only refer to 
a limited representation of the complexity of the world, and the outcomes of using a technique 
depend also on the perspective taken by the analyst and used to simplify the world. 
We compare to which extent the use of different families of techniques tend to “open up” (“close 
down”) the range of policy options (i.e. comparable outcomes) resulting from an FTA, and to 
which extent different techniques broaden (narrow) the range of inputs (i.e. sources of informa-
tion) used in technology appraisal. We will answer questions such as: how does the use of specific 
FTA techniques represents knowledge and incertitude, in particular the very incomplete nature of 
knowledge regarding future technological outcomes? How do they change the way in which we 
represent knowledge on future events initially considered unknown?
Analytical framework: the incompleteness of knowledge 
When an analyst decides to use a given FTA quantitative technique she makes a specific represen-
tation of knowledge, i.e. she assumes that some or all variables influencing aspects regarding the 
future technology can be known, others are uncertain, others are unknown and many others are 
irrelevant. Following Stirling and Scoones (2009), we distinguish two dimensions in the incom-
pleteness of knowledge, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Representations of knowledge that users of different FTA quantitative techniques may make. 
Source: Stirling and Scoones (2009).
 
The horizontal axis describes the perceived knowledge about outcomes. On the left hand side of 
Figure 1 the analyst considers the outcome of the FTA analysis as not problematic, and assumes 
that it is fixed. For example, an FTA analysis in the 1950s or 60s might have assumed that urban 
means of transportation would be based on the combustion engine. Knowledge about the type 
of the dominant engine technology was perceived as not problematic. However, an analyst in the 
2010s on urban means of transportation is likely to represent the possible type of technologies for 
urban transportation as relevant alternatives to evaluate. Not only there are diverse means (bicy-
cles, cars, metro, tramways), but also she is likely to think that new technological means might 
appear or their research may be induced. Hence, the knowledge about the outcomes of techno-
logical innovation are represented as problematic, or unknown (right side of Figure 1), whereas in 
the 1960s they were often represented as not problematic, or known (left side of Figure 1).
The vertical axis describes the perceived knowledge about the likelihoods about a certain aspect 
of a technology, a plausible instance of one of the outcomes (the different technologies). If the 
analyst perceives that a certain instance can be calculated in a probabilistic manner with a known 
generation mechanism of the probability distribution and an expected probability of its occur-
rence, then she is assuming that the knowledge about likelihoods is not problematic. For example, 
one analyst in the 1960s may have assumed that combustion car ownership trends in a given city 
were sufficient to “predict” the number of automobiles in the years to come. One analyst in the 
2010s might instead think that knowledge about the likelihood of combustion car ownerships is 
extremely problematic since it depends on a series of variables (public opinion on climate change, 
governmental regulations on pollution, public health measures, oil cost, and so on), which have 
behaved in an erratic way for the last 40 years. 
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This analytic framework leads to four potential “ideal manners of representing knowledge. It is in 
relation to these ideal representations of knowledge that we can now think on how different FTA 
techniques are conventionally perceived and used. We should emphasise that there is some flex-
ibility in how an analysts use of a given FTA represents knowledge. Here we describe the conven-
tional uses of the FTA techniques. 
When neither knowledge about likelihoods nor knowledge about outcomes is represented as 
problematic, the analysts engage in risk-based expectations (top left of Figure 1). Here there is a 
“neat” focus on a given technology and a method to estimate one of its aspects. This would be the 
case of many simple quantitative FTA techniques, such as trend extrapolation. This is the type of 
approach which is often associated with scientific techniques, possibly because it allows quantifi-
cation in a similar way that physics does. However, these methods are only valid to the extent that 
they ensure that exogenous conditions are controlled and fixed so that only the variables under 
investigation may have an effect on the outcomes. Yet, in practice, technology futures in the mid 
and longer terms unfold with many variables beyond control (public perceptions, energy source 
prices, other technologies, political and organisational preferences, events that cannot be known), 
changing radically and releasing unforeseen signals, having major effects on technological devel-
opment. 
Indeed, when dealing with future technologies, all sorts of changes in conditions — both endog-
enous and exogenous to the closed system analysed — assumed as stable may disturb the assump-
tions made by risk-based expectations FTA. If the analyst focuses on well-defined outcomes but 
represents the system as not being amenable to probabilistic analysis, then she moves into an area 
of uncertainty (bottom left in Figure 1). Roadmapping, which often includes quantitative descrip-
tion of technological trajectories, would be one such case. There is a consensus on the type of 
out-come desired, and hence the actors involved focus on achieving some given technological 
specifications. However, the roadmapping exercise is carried out without making assumptions on 
the likelihood of each instance of the outcome being achieved. A good example is the case of the 
International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors (ITRS, http://www.itrs.net) which spec-
ifies expected outcomes, while acknowledging uncertainty without carrying out probabilistic 
assumptions. 
Another way of representing the state of knowledge is to assume that probabilities are not problem-
atic, but that the knowledge of outcomes is problematic, because of conflicting assessments on the 
desirability of these outcomes. Such state is characterised by ambiguity. In principle, one cannot 
find many examples of quantitative FTA techniques leading to ambiguity because in quantitative 
approaches incomplete knowledge of type of outcomes often occurs with incomplete knowledge 
on likelihoods. However, many approaches using risk-based expectation type of assessment over 
diverse potential outcomes could fall into ambiguity. This would be the case, for example, of an 
exercise looking into future of urban transportation where the stakeholders agreed on the likeli-
hood that various technologies (bicycles, cars, metro, etcetera) were used in a near future on the 
basis of trend extrapolation, but the stakeholders did not agree on the desirability of those. 
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Finally, the state of knowledge can be represented as ignorance. This is the state of knowledge that 
Donald Rumsfeld, then US Defence Secretary, made famous with his quote on “unknown 
unknowns”, namely those “things we do not know we don’t know.” In short, when an analyst 
considers that she is in a state of ignorance, she assumes that she does not know what are the 
potential types of outcomes (or their desirability), nor the probability that they occur. One might 
think that ignorance is the most sensible way to represent technological futures, given that futur-
ology or forecasting have an extremely bad record on prediction. But ignorance is a difficult state 
to work with. One can try to carry out forecasting or foresight with some known potential 
outcomes, but how should one characterise quantitatively unknowns? 
The representation of knowledge by users of FTA techniques 
In Figure 2 we map the 10 groups of FTA quantitative techniques surveyed in Ciarli, Coad and 
Rafols (2012) according to their relative position with respect to the representation of knowledge 
that a user has before an FTA exercise. For all techniques the knowledge on probabilities is 
initially represented as problematic. 
Techniques vary to a large extent with respect to how the knowledge on outcomes is represented. 
Some techniques are prevalently employed when the outcomes of the technology under investi-
gation are already perceived as relatively certain. For example, the use of Trend Analyses to 
describe the diffusion of a technology in terms of the share of users. Other techniques are 
employed when the knowledge about outcomes is presented as highly problematic. In this short 
version of the article, we only illustrate how the use of FTA changes the representation of knowl-
edge with reference to Trends Analyses (Figure 3) and different types of Modelling (Figure 4). 
Figure 5 presents all the techniques reviewed.
The choice of techniques that are part of the Trend Analyses family tends to have a closing-down 
effect since the beginning of an FTA exercise because of the use of very restrictive assumptions. 
Their use tends to increase the certainty about the representation of knowledge even more. 
In the case of modelling, the effect depends on the type of modelling. Different economic methods 
have very different effects on technology appraisal (Figure 4). On the one hand Prediction Markets 
close down on one single outcome and a well defined expected value with low variance (Risk-Based 
Expectations). On the other hand, Input-Output models may even open up to different scenarios, 
although the relevant outcomes are usually defined at the outset. Simulation Models usually 
allow to open to a number of different, even non-predicted outcomes. Starting from a condition of 
ignorance — fewer assumptions on the outcomes, Quantitative Scenarios represent one relatively 
elaborate way to use Simulation Modelling. Their aim is to find conditions under which a large 
number of different outcomes can be realised. The only reduction in policy space occurs towards 
a perceived increase of knowledge about the likelihood of the different outcomes. This is achieved 
thanks to the combination of a large number of conditions defined by a number of parameters.
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Figure 2. The representation of knowledge about outcomes and probabilities before an FTA.
 
Figure 3. The change in the representation of knowledge about outcomes and probabilities using an FTA 




Figure 4. The change in the representation of knowledge about outcomes and probabilities using an FTA 
quantitative techniques. The case of different types of modelling: Economic Methods, Simulation Models 
and Scenario Modelling.
 
Figure 5. The change in the representation of knowledge about outcomes and probabilities: using techniques.
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Distinguishing between foresight and forecasting 
FTA techniques that focus on a given outcome and specific properties in order to provide alleg-
edly quantitatively rigorous approaches (generally falling in the risk-based expectations zone, 
Figure 6, top left), do so at the expense of putting blinders to phenomena which are very difficult 
to quantify and which may dramatically alter the results of the “prediction” (an unexpected war, 
conflict, or terrorist attack). These are the type of approaches that resemble in one way or the other 
the traditional forecasting literature.
As a result of the repeated failure of forecasting exercises, policy-oriented analysis of future tech-
nologies puts the emphasis on foresight rather than quantitative forecasting. This practical focus 
acknowledges that the usefulness of foresight lies in opening up a process to discuss technolog-
ical futures in the face of insurmountable incertitude, rather than trying to predict the future. The 
contribution of quantitative techniques to foresight seems to be best achieved via FTA tech-
niques that represent knowledge as incomplete, either in terms of the probability of known 
outcomes or in the type of outcomes.
Figure 6. The representation of knowledge about outcomes and probabilities
and their role in Forecast and Foresight FTA.
Breadth of inputs and “participation” in FTA: the role of new techniques 
The advantage in using new crowd-sourcing based techniques is that they collect information 
from a very large number of users, rather than from a small number of experts or from structured 
sources that acquired an authoritative status such as patent and scientific publication datasets. In 
other words, they broaden the source of inputs, including outputs and opinions that were not 
usually included in FTA. Indeed, by monitoring the opinions and sentiments on blogs and social 
85
network such as Twitter, it is possible to use more or less spontaneous opinions about past, present 
and future events (the degree of spontaneity is increasingly problematic: monitoring is already 
resulting in manipulations). 
Although these methods collect very diverse types of information and therefore they broaden up 
the diversity of information sources, they do not necessarily have an opening up effect in deci-
sion making. Let us think for example in carbon-based nanotechnologies. The exponential boom 
in presence of fullerenes and carbon-nanotubes in databases and the web in the 1990s meant that 
most quantitative FTA techniques would have focused on the impact of these two types of carbon 
materials. This focussing (closing-down) effect might have had a blinding effect, preventing to see 
that there was ongoing research on other carbon-based nanomaterials, and hence it would have 
missed out the possibility that graphene, another carbon-based nanomaterial, would become 
important. Instead a simple qualitative study that discussed diverse carbon-based nanomaterials 
could have mentioned graphene, since it had been studied theoretically for decades. This example 
illustrates that quantitative power does not imply capacity for seeing more alternative futures — an 
opening up of perspectives.




The improvements in computational capabilities are resulting in the creation of new FTA tech-
niques that promise great improvements in their capacity to generate reliable predictions. The 
analytical framework we proposed should help discern the type of contribution to policy that 
they can make. 
Our analysis suggests that the most promising quantitative methods for conducting FTA in a 
sophisticated manner are those that allow the analysis to explore states of ignorance — in which 
neither future technology outcomes nor their probability are known — and bring the user to a 
state of ambiguity, in which future outcomes are compared against different probabilities of 
occurring, and users can evaluate a number of trade-off. 
These exercises are not capable to predict instances of outcomes, but they help explore the future 
in a conditional manner, acknowledging the incompleteness of knowledge. Using the techniques 
plotted in the ambiguity quadrant of the knowledge map, one can investigate the possibility of 
reaching certain outcomes under circumstances that are unknown but can be investigated in a 
conditional manner. We suggest that these types of agent modelling and scenario modelling are 
the ones which can make a more positive contribution to policy-oriented FTA — by avoiding 
narrow prediction and allowing plural exploration of future technologies. 
Finally, monitoring methods (such raw bibliometrics or web-scraping) may be able to identify 
potential outcomes and be useful for activities such as horizon-scanning, but they have limited 
analytical potential on their own. Therefore, their usefulness depends on their implementation 
within a larger foresight methodology. 
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